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Abstract
The creation of executive agencies outside core departments has been a major 
element of administrative reforms throughout Europe during the past two 
decades, driven by a managerial logic, which also has been at the core of most 
academic works on “agencification.” In this article, the authors take a differ-
ent perspective by focusing on executive agencies’ influence in the policy 
process. The authors analyze the policy influence of a large executive agency 
with service delivery tasks in the context of a parliamentary system of gov-
ernment (Flanders, Belgium). A comparison of the agency’s influence in two 
major policy processes shows that a complex interplay of policy content, 
patterns of interaction, and mutual trust with the political leadership and orga-
nizational characteristics helps in explaining the observed patterns of influence. 
The findings also raise normative concerns regarding potential problems of 
disconnecting operations from policy formulation via agencification.
Keywords
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In many countries throughout Europe, executive agencies have been created 
throughout the past 10 to 20 years by hiving off organizational units from min-
isterial departments, by separating horizontally integrated functions or by set-
ting up agencies for new tasks (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Kickert & Beck 
Jørgensen, 1995; OECD, 2002; Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield, 
& Smullen, 2004). In the European context, executive agencies are generally 
characterized by a public law legal status, functional separation from their par-
ent ministries or departments, some decision-making competencies which are 
not enjoyed by the parent department itself (e.g., managerial decisions), but no 
statutory independence of the parent department, which may alter the orga-
nization’s budget or interfere in operational goals and decisions of the orga-
nization (Pollitt et al., 2004, p. 10). In parliamentary systems of government, 
executive agencies are primarily controlled by the parent department and its 
political leadership. Thus, there is much less direct parliamentary control of 
executive agencies such as in the United States where federal agencies are 
“caught in the middle” (Weingast, 2005) between the influence of the presi-
dent and the two houses of Congress.
The main reform elements were hiving off executive organizations from 
ministerial bureaucracies (headed by a politically accountable minister), grant-
ing extended levels of managerial freedom, and introducing some kind of per-
formance management (Talbot, 2004a). In line with the managerial focus of 
agencification, there is a large body of literature on these reforms and their 
effects in terms of public sector performance (Dunsire, Hartley, & Parker, 
1991; James, 2003; Pollitt, 2006; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Talbot, 2004b; 
van Thiel, 2000; Verhoest, 2002).
In contrast, the implications of agencification reforms on the relationship 
between parent departments and executive agencies in the policy-making pro-
cess got little attention. In this context, Pollitt et al. (2004) argue that splitting 
policy and operations is not a generic feature of agencification reforms and 
provide several examples of executive agencies with either explicit or implicit 
policy functions. However, assuming that policy design is an important func-
tion or activity of executive agencies, there is surprisingly little research on the 
empirical dimension of this issue, about the channels of influence, and about 
possible explanations for observed (lack of) influence (e.g., Carpenter, 2001; 
Egeberg, 1995; Elder & Page, 1998; Gains, 2003; Jacobsson, 1984; Verschuere, 
2009). If one of the objectives of agencification reforms has been to strengthen 
operational matters in policy formulation (Gains, 2003; Kickert & Beck 
Jørgensen, 1995), the question whether executive agencies actually have some 
influence in policy decisions and how this influence looks like becomes highly 
relevant. For instance, according to an official report on the U.K. executive 
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agencies (HM Treasury & The Prime Minister’s Office of Public Services 
Reform, 2002), executive agencies have become disconnected from their par-
ent departments and are “treated as a self-contained project from the business 
of policy-making” (p. 11).
In this article, we address the relationship and interactions between depart-
ments and their political leadership and executive agencies in the policy-making 
process in Flanders (the largest state of federal Belgium). In 2000, the Flemish 
government embarked on the so-called “Better Governmental Policy” reform, 
which was put into practice in 2006 (Rommel & Christiaens, 2009). The prin-
ciples behind this reform were an increased managerial autonomy for execu-
tive agencies, combined with a decreased policy-making role. Under the 
so-called “primacy of politics,” policy making is the prerogative of the govern-
ment and its central administration, whereas executive agencies should stick to 
implementing these policies (Verschuere, 2009). However, the question is 
to what extent this rather theoretical role division between policy making 
(government and its administration) and policy implementation (executive 
agencies) is observed in reality. The research questions are the following: 
(a) To what extent has the case organization, a large executive agency with 
service delivery tasks, been able to influence key policy decisions in its area 
of activity? (b) how can differences in policy influence among different poli-
cies and decision stages be explained? and (c) what lessons can be drawn 
about the policy influence of service delivery agencies in parliamentary sys-
tems more generally?
The article is divided into four parts. In the following section, we provide 
an overview of the literature on policy influence of bureaucratic actors and 
executive agencies. Then, we develop an analytical framework for the study 
of executive agencies’ policy influence. Next, we present the results of our 
case study. Finally, we discuss our findings and propose some directions 
for further research.
Policy Influence of Administrative 
Actors: Literature Review
According to a common understanding of democratic governance, adminis-
trative actors should implement policies that were decided on by democrati-
cally legitimised politicians (Peters, 1988; Svara, 2006a). The separation of 
policy and operations as a means for improving management or political con-
trol (or both at the same time) is also a classical argument in public sector 
reform (Hood & Jackson, 1991). This argument is at the core of the creation 
of executive or arm’s length agencies in many countries. For example, in the 
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recent Flemish Better Governmental Policy reform, it is explicitly recognized 
that autonomous agencies implement the policies decided on by politicians 
and prepared by central ministries (Verschuere, 2009).
However, a large number of studies show that this dichotomous distribu-
tion of roles of political and administrative actors does not adequately reflect 
empirical reality (Aberbach, Putnam, & Rockman, 1981; Aberbach & Rockman, 
1988; Kingdon, 1984; Peters, 1988). Yet, these studies mostly focus on senior 
bureaucrats in ministerial bureaucracies (Aberbach et al., 1981; Derlien, 2003; 
Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975; Olsen, 1983; Vancoppenolle, 2006) as well as within 
local government administrations (Jacobsen, 2006; Svara, 2006b). Also, the 
discretion of administrative agencies and “street-level bureaucracy” (Lipsky, 
1980) in the implementation of policies has been extensively studied (see 
deLeon & deLeon, 2002 for an overview of this research). These studies show 
that despite important differences across countries, policy fields, and over 
time regarding the functions performed by politicians and administrators and 
the discretion of public managers, it is virtually impossible to clearly distin-
guish between policy and administration in practice.
However, this has not kept administrative reformers from creating execu-
tive agencies, by which “executive work should be given more attention, more 
esteem, more influence” (Kickert & Beck Jørgensen, 1995, p. 581). Yet, these 
authors also warn that the result could not only be a stronger consideration of 
the feasibility of proposed policy measures, but a “dual policy system” (p. 582) 
in which agencies develop their own policy proposals, which may conflict with 
the intentions of the political leadership and the parent department.
Against this background, there is surprisingly little empirical research on 
the distribution of functions between ministries on the one hand and execu-
tive arm’s length agencies on the other hand, in particular with regard to 
policy design. A study by Egeberg (1995) on two planning processes in the 
transportation sector in Norway shows that a large degree of policy making took 
place at the agency level, albeit with some differences across the two agencies 
involved, which explain variations in policy influence. In the Swedish context, 
Jacobsson (1984) studies the relative influence of agencies and ministries with 
regard to major policy changes in six policy fields, also showing varied, but 
generally large input of agencies in policy decisions. However, Swedish 
agencies are an exceptional case because of their long agency tradition and a 
constitutionally guaranteed independence of agencies from ministerial over-
sight (Pierre, 2004). Elder and Page (1998) confirm a relatively strong policy 
influence of Swedish agencies in comparison with German agencies, but they 
also stress major differences and mixed levels of policy influence between 
agencies from the same country and across  politico-administrative contexts. 
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Also, they point at the importance of the ministries’ willingness to let agencies 
have a say in policy decisions. Among others, the characteristic function of an 
agency seems to mediate its policy influence (Elder & Page, 1998). Here, it 
is important to note that the effect of task characteristics (e.g., political 
salience, technical complexity, and degree of commercial activities) on 
agency autonomy and management is repeatedly emphasized in the research 
literature (Beck Jørgensen, Hansen, Antonsen, & Melander, 1998; Pollitt, 
2006; Yesilkagit, 2004). The effect of the ministry’s propensity toward 
including agencies in policy decisions is also emphasized in a study of 
executive agencies in the United Kingdom and their relationships with 
ministers and departments (Gains, 2003). This study shows that agencies 
increasingly could influence the development of their operational goals. 
Besides that, some agencies were found to develop distinct policy preferences 
and to translate these preferences into the policy agenda. Carpenter (2001), in 
a historical study of three U.S. agencies, shows that agencies may become 
really distinct political entities with a lot of capacity to forge their own pre-
ferred policy decision making. The embeddedness of these agencies (and their 
leaders) in networks and the organizational capacities that were built up over 
time may give agencies a strong reputation and provide them with legitimacy. 
This reputation and legitimacy enable agencies to influence the policy agenda 
in their favor.
Besides research that is case study based, recently some efforts have been 
undertaken to measure the discretion of executive agencies via large-N survey 
research in several countries, including Flanders (Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert, 
& Verschuere, 2004), the Netherlands (Yesilkagit & van Thiel, 2008), Norway 
(Lægreid, Roness, & Rubecksen, 2006), Ireland (McGauran, Verhoest, & 
Humphreys, 2005), and Germany (Bach, 2010). In these surveys, the manage-
ment of executive agencies was asked whether the agency is able to make 
choices about the target groups of the policy or the policy instruments to apply. 
For all countries that have been surveyed, it was found that the majority of the 
agencies report to have a large say in the choice of target groups and policy 
instruments. However, these studies also report clear differences across agen-
cies, as they may take these decisions totally autonomously, after having con-
sulted the political oversight authorities, or within some conditions set by the 
parent ministry.
The conclusion of this overview of the literature is that most research, 
small-N or large-N, confirms that executive agencies may have significant 
influence in policy formulation (yet with clear variation among agencies and 
countries) and generally seem to have substantive discretion when imple-
menting policies. However, the research is very diverse and heterogeneous as 
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to methods and concepts used. Many different conceptualizations of policy 
influence are applied, often in a one-dimensional way. For instance, the large-
N survey research looks at the actors taking policy decisions about target groups 
and policy instruments, which is a very narrow concept of policy influence as 
the level of discretion agencies have in implementing policy (Ringeling, 
1978). Huber and Shipan (2002) do this in a rather formalistic way by looking 
at the level of discretion that is left to the agency, after the principals have 
designed the legislation that should be implemented by the executive agency. 
This legislation may be detailed or not, resulting in a certain level of discretion 
for the agency while implementing policies.
Other research looks at policy influence as the extent to which agencies are 
able to set the policy agenda themselves, hence deciding on the policies and 
the very content of the policies. Carpenter (2001) applies an extended concep-
tualization of policy influence of public agencies by looking at the autonomy of 
the agency to take the decisive step toward new policy by establishing the pol-
icy agenda. Hammond and Knott (1999), in a theoretical exercise, take a similar 
stance by looking at the influence public managers can have by making or pro-
posing significant policy choices themselves in a political setting.
An Analytical Model for Assessing  
Executive Agencies’ Policy Influence
We bring together these various conceptualizations in a multidimensional 
model of executive agencies’ policy influence. This allows us to take into 
account the different policy programs in which agencies are involved, the dif-
ferent stages in the policy cycle, and the policy-related decisions taken. Also, 
this broad conceptualization enables us to assess the relative influence of 
executive agencies in decisions taken in different stages of different policy 
programs, providing a more complete understanding of executive agencies’ 
policy influence, both in terms of policy formulation, decision making, and 
bureaucratic discretion. We distinguish between four levels of analysis:
The first dimension of analysis is the policy program. Although existing 
studies either focus on policy influence in general (Elder & Page, 1998) or com-
pare the influence of different agencies in the development of different policy 
programs (Egeberg, 1995; Jacobsson, 1984), we suggest studying the policy 
influence of the same agency across different policy programs. As we will show 
below, an agency’s influence on policy decisions may not be the same for all 
policies within its area of responsibility.
Second, we look at the agency’s policy influence from a dynamic perspec-
tive by referring to the ideal-type policy cycle (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). On the 
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one hand, an agency may to a greater or lesser extent be involved in authori-
tative decisions about the content of policy programs (e.g., choosing desired 
goals and outputs to be delivered by the policy; Carpenter, 2001; Egeberg, 
1995; Hammond & Knott, 1999). On the other hand, an agency may also be 
able to make autonomous decisions in policy implementation (e.g., deciding 
in individual cases and deciding on how to process the policy; Huber & 
Shipan, 2002; Krause, 2003; Ringeling, 1978).
Third, an agency can have influence with regard to operational, tactical, 
or strategic policy decisions (Verhoest, 2002; Verhoest et al., 2004). Strategic 
policy decisions deal with the general principles, goals, and desired societal 
effects to be achieved with the policy. Tactical policy decisions deal with the 
choice of the quantity and the quality of the outputs that should be delivered 
via the policy program, the target group, and the policy instruments. Finally, 
operational policy decisions are about procedures and activities that have to be 
performed to deliver the intended outputs.
Fourth, policy influence is a relational concept, as policy making is a pro-
cess of interaction between various actors with different types of resources. In 
complex policy fields, political actors, administrative actors, and societal actors 
(e.g., advocacy groups) all together have a stake in the policies to be designed. 
Hence, the influence of these actors in shaping policy will also depend on the 
level of influence other actors are able to exert. In other words, policies are 
the result of interaction between a variety of actors involved in a given policy 
subsystem (Beck Jørgensen et al., 1998; Gains, 2003; Kingdon, 1984).
In sum, the agency’s policy influence is the extent to which it influences the 
eventual content of the decisions that were made about the policy in different 
stages of the policy process (thus not only in the decision-making phase but 
also during the preparation, the implementation, and the evaluation) of differ-
ent policy programs.
The Case of the Flemish  
Public Transport Agency
Data and Method
In the empirical part of this article, we study the policy influence of an execu-
tive agency with extensive service delivery tasks in the context of a parliamen-
tary system of government (Flanders). The research design can be characterized 
as within-case analysis; we analyze two distinct policy programs in which 
the agency has been involved at various decision stages and which are imple-
mented by the agency. The case study provides a thick description of the 
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agency’s role in the selected decision-making processes. This allows us to 
draw inferences on the effect of policy program and actor constellations on the 
agency’s policy influence (strategic, tactical, and operational) in the different 
stages of the decision-making processes. We discuss the relevance of our 
empirical findings and develop several theoretical propositions in the final 
chapter of this article.
The case organization is the Flemish Public Transport Agency (Vlaamse 
Vervoermaatschappij De Lijn [VVM]), which is responsible for providing 
bus and tram services all over Flanders. VVM is a territorially decentralized 
organization, which has one central headquarters and five regional offices. 
The day-to-day management of the agency is performed by a director-general, 
who also implements the decisions of the agency’s board. The board is headed 
by a president and consists of key stakeholder representatives such as the state 
government, the local and provincial authorities, and the unions. The political 
oversight authority of VVM is the Minister of Mobility and his cabinet of 
politically appointed advisors, whereas the administrative oversight authority 
(composed of permanent civil servants) is the Department of Environment 
and Infrastructure.
The Flemish Public Transport Agency is one of the largest so-called exter-
nally autonomous agencies in Flanders; it has over 7,000 employees of which 
80% are blue-collar workers such as technicians and bus drivers. The case 
organization thus represents a class of agencies that typically have exten-
sive service delivery tasks (Verschuere, 2007). In addition, VMM is a highly 
politically salient agency: It has a relatively large budget, it has more staff 
than most other public organizations in Flanders, and it obviously has a lot 
of contact with the public (Gains, 2003; Pollitt, 2006). Also, public trans-
port traditionally has a high importance as a means of transport in the rela-
tively small and densely populated state of Flanders and the neighboring 
Brussels region.
The policy programs were selected after consulting several people closely 
related to the agency. Both programs are relatively recent, which makes them 
easily accessible for data collection. Also, both programs affect a high number 
of citizens and thus are highly visible. The “basic mobility” program is a major 
reform of the supply of public transport in the whole Flemish region and every 
single local authority, which defines public transport as social right to every-
body. To this aim, public transport services are to be provided following a set 
of minimal criteria (e.g., frequency of service and walking distances). The 
policy line of basic mobility was put on the political agenda in 1995 for the 
first time, it was formalized in a parliamentary decree in 2001, and the imple-
mentation of the policy was nearly finished in 2006. The second policy 
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program “Pegasus” mainly affects the region of the Flemish Diamond and 
the people who live and work there. The Flemish Diamond is the metropoli-
tan area between the cities of Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels, and Leuven, and it is 
the economic center of Flanders in which 57% of the Flemish population lives 
and 60% of the total Flemish workforce is employed. The key objective of 
Pegasus is to increase the region’s accessibility by strengthening public trans-
port. The so-called “Minder Hinder” measures in Antwerp are a major imple-
mentation project of Pegasus. Minder Hinder is the total of measures taken 
to decrease the negative effects of the renovation of the ring road around 
Antwerp, one of the busiest highways in Europe. This renovation decreased 
the ringroad’s capacity by 15%, hence large traffic problems were expected. 
The problem of the future accessibility of Flanders’ large cities was perceived 
as a serious issue in 1999 for the first time, the implementation of Minder 
Hinder started in 2004, and this article investigates this process until 2005 
when a decision to continue the project was taken. In terms of their relative 
budgetary weight, both programs are largely similar: basic mobility and the 
Minder Hinder measures stand for, respectively, 12% and 10% of VVM’s 
annual budget of 700 million Euros in 2004.
The crucial difference between these policies is their level of detail, as 
basic mobility is much more formalized and detailed than Pegasus. The bottom 
line is that basic mobility is based on a decree that was voted in Parliament, 
which was followed by several executive decisions. These regulations arrange 
the way basic mobility is to be implemented in the field with a high level of 
detail. Next to that, a parliamentary decree implies a binding commitment, 
which has direct political and budgetary consequences. Basic mobility is 
defined as a citizen’s right and has to be implemented within a given time limit 
and budget. In contrast, the policy of Pegasus is only formalized to a small 
extent. Its formal status is a policy plan that has been taken up in the govern-
mental agreement implying a commitment by the government to take initia-
tives toward implementing this policy. Such a commitment has less direct 
consequences than a decree as it does not imply any legal obligations. Next 
to that, the implementation of the projects under the Pegasus umbrella is spec-
ified in a much less detailed way compared with basic mobility. The only piece 
of formal regulation is the governmental decision on “net management” that 
accompanies the decree on basic mobility. This policy defines procedures 
and quality criteria on which the public transport network needs to be orga-
nized. Thus, all public transport implementation projects need to follow this 
methodology, including Minder Hinder.
The research process was guided by the following questions: (a) What are 
the key policy decisions (and what is the content of these decisions) taken in 
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the different phases of the policy process? (b) to what extent did the agency 
have a decisive influence on the content of these decisions? and (c) what other 
actors were involved in the policy decision–making process?
In terms of data collection, the case study relies on an extensive document 
analysis, including parliamentary notes (parliamentary questions and tran-
scripts of parliamentary discussions), internal notes of meetings (e.g., the board 
of VVM), internal notes of the monthly meetings between ministerial cabinet 
(political advisors), oversight administration and VVM, legislation (decrees, 
ministerial, and governmental decisions), scientific studies, and anonymous 
documents (of which the author could be identified by asking the involved 
actors). Also, semistructured expert interviews (N = 32) were used to validate 
the findings. The respondents were selected for their expertise in the policy 
programs under scrutiny, and the sample included people from VVM (manage-
ment, board, and provincial entities), the ministerial cabinets of mobility, mem-
bers of parliament, people from the parent department, independent experts, 
and stakeholders. The following section summarizes the empirical findings.
Empirical Results
In the preparation phase of both policy programs, the key decisions were mainly 
strategic (identifying problems, formulating objectives, and defining desirable 
policy effects). In the case of basic mobility, the major objective is giving 
equal access to mobility to everyone. Next to that, an intention to hardwire the 
policy of basic mobility in a parliamentary decree was agreed on. In this stage 
of the policy process, the decisive actor was the Minister of Mobility, and the 
influence of the agency (VVM) in these preparatory decisions was rather low.
In the case of the Pegasus plan, the decision revolved around guaranteeing 
the accessibility of the economic heart of Flanders, by means of increasing 
public transport supply. The role of public transport in solving mobility prob-
lems was explicitly recognized, and plans were drafted to increase the capacity 
of public transport in this area. VVM was a strong advocate for the develop-
ment of comprehensive public transport planning in the metropolitan areas 
and was very active with regard to contracting research studies that would 
underpin these plans. Thus, together with the ministerial cabinet as the main 
actor and the administrative oversight authority, VVM had a large influence in 
the strategic vision-building of mobility in the Flemish Diamond.
In the decision-making phase of both basic mobility and Pegasus, the key 
decisions are about the quantity and quality of public transport service delivery, 
which are mostly tactical policy decisions. The parliamentary decree of 
basic mobility defines general principles for service delivery, which are 
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operationalized via governmental decisions on norms for basic mobility (e.g., 
frequency of services and distance between bus stops) and quality criteria for 
developing the public transport network (the so-called net management deci-
sion). During this phase, the Minister of Mobility and his advisors made the 
most important decisions, whereas the influence of the agency in these deci-
sions varied. During the first period of the decision-making stage, in which 
the decree and governmental decision on basic mobility were decided on, the 
influence of VVM was rather small, it had mainly an advisory role (e.g., com-
menting on draft versions of the decree), and its suggestions were not always 
followed. However, later on during the decision process on net manage-
ment, the input of the agency was much larger. In particular, VVM coordi-
nated the drafting process of the corresponding governmental decision in 
which also the cabinet and permanent ministry staff were involved.
The picture is rather different for the decision making on Pegasus, in which 
VVM had a major influence (the plan was essentially prepared by VVM’s 
provincial entities). This plan defines the future ideal public transport service 
delivery in the Flemish Diamond by making choices about the outputs (level 
and type of future public service delivery) that will be necessary to reach the 
goal of accessibility of the region. Also, together with the Minster of Mobility 
and his cabinet, and by obtaining the support of parliament and local govern-
ments, VVM successfully managed to have the plan included in the policy 
program of a newly elected government.
During the implementation of basic mobility, two different kinds of opera-
tional decisions were made. The first types of decisions pertain to the imple-
mentation trajectory. As the policy of basic mobility needed to be implemented 
in every local community of Flanders, decisions had to be made about the 
sequence of implementation, as budgetary constraints made the simultaneous 
implementation of the policy in all local communities impossible. During the 
first phase of the programming, the minister was the key actor to decide (i.e., 
making priority lists), and the input of VVM was rather low. This changed in 
later phases of the programming, when VVM was able to exert real influence 
in the setting of priority lists for implementation, whereas the influence of the 
minister and the cabinet decreased substantially. The second kind of decisions 
in the implementation phase is about how to put into practice the decree in the 
individual local communities, which includes defining bus trajectories, choos-
ing types of public transport vehicles, and so on. In these kinds of operational 
decisions, VVM has been dominant from day one because of its operational 
knowledge.
In contrast to the policy of basic mobility, no immediate commitment was 
made for implementing Pegasus. One window of opportunity was opened in 
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the early 2000s with the infrastructure works of the Antwerp ring road. During 
these works, traffic capacity decreased considerably, and as a solution, the pub-
lic transport capacity was to be increased (the Minder Hinder plan). As the 
plans for increasing public transport capacity in this area were already 
there (as part of the larger Pegasus plan), these measures could immedi-
ately be implemented. VVM’s policy proposal was entirely accepted by the 
government.
During the evaluation of basic mobility, choices were made about the con-
tinuation of the policy, without questioning or altering the output norms or the 
goals of the policy. The government decided not only to continue basic mobil-
ity but also to be more realistic and pragmatic in applying the strict norms of 
the decree (e.g., about bus frequencies and vehicles). This evaluation took 
place in 2005 after increasing parliamentary critique because of the large bud-
getary impact of the policy. The decision to continue with the implementation 
on a more pragmatic basis (i.e., taking into consideration budgetary constraints) 
was jointly made by the agency and the minister and his cabinet, based on an 
in-house evaluation report by VVM.
In the evaluation phase of Minder Hinder (Pegasus), the focus predomi-
nantly was on tactical policy choices, that is, whether the policy output (public 
transport services) had reached the defined goals. Also, decisions were taken 
about the future level of public transport service delivery. The implementation 
of Minder Hinder turned out to be a big success, as the number of public trans-
port users had increased considerably and the expected traffic problems during 
the works on the ring road were not as severe as expected. Following this posi-
tive evaluation, VVM could manage to have the decision forged that these—
initially temporary—measures became permanent at a somewhat lower level.
Comparing Agency Influence in  
Two Policy Programs: Key Findings
Without doubt, we observe a lot of variation regarding the Flemish Public 
Transport Agency’s influence in the decision processes under scrutiny. Three 
findings deserve particular attention: First, in the preparation and decision-
making phases, the influence of VVM on the policy of Pegasus was generally 
higher compared with basic mobility. VVM had a large influence on the deci-
sions concerning the vision and principles of maintaining the accessibility 
of the Flemish Diamond and the role of the public transport therein. The 
policy vision that was mainly prepared by VVM was eventually included in a 
politically approved plan.
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In contrast, VVM hardly had any influence on the vision-building about the 
role of the public transport in the policy of basic mobility. Furthermore, VVM 
had no say in the decisions on specific norms for service delivery in the decree 
and the governmental decision on basic mobility. The only exception to this 
picture is the governmental decision on net management, which was written by 
VVM, defining the quality of the public transport network in Flanders. In the 
case of Pegasus, the executive agency managed to have its own policy vision 
politically approved and formalized. In the case of basic mobility, the agency 
merely had an advisory role in the decision-making process, in which it would 
comment on draft policy documents and suggest changes to some details. 
Thus, also taking into consideration the different time periods in which the 
policy lines under scrutiny were prepared and formulated, we find that the 
policy influence of VVM regarding policy preparation and determination 
clearly increased during the period of analysis.
Second, the influence of VVM in the implementation and evaluation phases 
of both policy programs is rather high. This finding is in line with the rhetoric 
of agencification reforms, according to which executive agencies should have 
substantial operational discretion to provide their services in an efficient and 
effective manner (Pollitt et al., 2004). In the case of basic mobility, VVM 
designed the implementation projects and carried them out in the field. This 
often happened in a pragmatic way, not rigidly adhering to the norms for ser-
vice delivery that have been formalized in the decree. However, the minister 
and his cabinet controlled this process in its early stages when potentially 
conflict-ridden decisions on the sequence of implementation had to be taken. 
Similarly, in the case of Minder Hinder (Pegasus), the agency had consider-
able degrees of freedom in the design and implementation of specific public 
transport measures in the field, which arguably were even higher compared 
with basic mobility: The agency could decide, within the budgets accorded, by 
what kind of service delivery a defined policy goal could be reached (and how 
the services needed to be delivered).
A third general observation is that in most policy phases studied, the cabinet 
of the Minister of Mobility (i.e., the political oversight authority) was the most 
influential actor, whereas the influence of the oversight ministry in the policy 
decisions was generally low. This observation reflects characteristic features of 
the policy-making process in Flanders, which is dominated by large ministerial 
cabinets of advisers (personal political secretariats of the minister). Thus, the 
agency’s policy influence in the formulation and decision stages primarily 
depends on the ministerial cabinet’s willingness to include the agency in the 
decision process and to accepting the agency’s suggestions.1 The basic mobility 
policy was rather controversial among the coalition parties, and the minister had 
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a strong interest in developing this policy together with his cabinet, hence 
excluding other actors that may potentially dilute the initial policy objectives.
Theoretical Discussion
The empirical analysis shows that agency influence in policy decisions varies 
between policy programs, phases in the policy process, and the actor constel-
lations at a given point of time. For instance, VVM was very much involved 
in developing the broad policy objectives of Pegasus but was virtually absent 
in setting the strategic lines of the policy of basic mobility. In addition, we 
find that the agency’s policy influence in the preparation and decision phases 
increased over time. Hence, in analytical terms, executive agencies’ policy 
influence may be explained by the interplay of policy characteristics and fea-
tures of the actors involved (here, the executive agency and the minister and 
his cabinet of advisors).
The observation that agency autonomy may vary across policy issues, and 
that explanations for levels of policy autonomy should be considerate of this, 
has also been shown by Hammond (2003) who finds that the “preference vari-
able” (the extent to which actors in the decision-making process prefer a cer-
tain policy or not) may vary per issue area (or per policy program) and that as 
a result the bureaucratic autonomy of the agency may be expected to vary 
as well. Thus, the preference distribution of the actors involved will help in 
explaining levels of policy influence. In a similar vein, Peters (2001) argues 
that “bureaucratic organizations frequently have their own well-developed ideas 
about what government should do,” which he terms “agency ideology” (p. 222). 
This ideology may come in a “soft version,” which emphasizes continuity and 
the way things are currently done in the organization, but it also may take the 
form of a “hard version,” which essentially consists of setting new policy priori-
ties based on the bureaucracy’s long-standing expertise in the field. The case 
study provides evidence of both types of bureaucratic policy preferences. In the 
following, we discuss three policy-related explanations for the level of agency 
influence in a certain program or in a certain policy phase (Verschuere, 2006).
First, the attitude of the agency toward the policy or the “fit” of the agency 
ideology and the proposed policy is a highly program related factor. We may 
assume that one and the same agency may have a positive attitude toward 
one policy program in which it is engaged, although it may have negative 
attitudes toward other policy programs. The factor “attitude” can thus help to 
explain why the VVM exerted more influence in the policy of Pegasus, com-
pared with the policy of basic mobility. VVM was rather sceptical toward the 
policy of basic mobility because its ideas about the (social) role of public 
Verschuere and Bach 197
transport and about how public transport should be delivered and organized 
conflicted with the basic tenets of basic mobility. To the contrary, the strong 
influence of VVM in the policy of Pegasus can be explained, at least partly, by 
the enthusiastic attitude of VVM toward Pegasus because extended public 
transport in densely populated areas has always been a priority for VVM. 
Moreover, we find that the agency ideology is most important in the prepara-
tory stage of the policy. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that attitudes 
of the agency toward the policy program will mainly be formed during the 
early preparation phases of the policy, when the policy is designed.
Also the “functionality for the agency” or the expected gains or losses to be 
involved in the decision-making process may be an important factor for deter-
mining agency’s level of influence. What functionality means will be deter-
mined by specific features of the policy program at stake. In the case of Pegasus, 
the early policy plans seemed to offer a window of opportunity for VVM to 
realize what they desired for a longtime: extended public transport in the met-
ropolitan areas. In contrast, VVM to a certain extent feared the basic mobility 
policy because it proposed nothing less than a revolution in the organization 
of public transport, as it would have shifted from a demand-based to a supply-
based provision of public transport services. Furthermore, in the case the pol-
icy is prepared by the agency (thus reflecting the policy preferences of the 
agency), it can be advantageous for the agency to be strongly involved in the 
determination process of the policy and to guard that the initial policy propos-
als are also politically approved accordingly (e.g., Pegasus). In the case the 
policy has been prepared mainly by the oversight authorities, it may be func-
tional for the agency to try to “adapt” initial policy proposals made by others 
to their own preferences (e.g., basic mobility).
Perhaps not surprisingly, the mechanism of “functionality” was found to 
play a large role in those policy phases when binding decisions were made, 
such as the determination phase and the evaluation phase of the policy. Here, 
the specific task of the executive agency seems to play an important role. The 
empirical findings suggest that executive agencies with extensive service deliv-
ery functions have a high stake in keeping their policy environment in a way 
that enables them to perform their tasks as smoothly as possible. In other 
words, to produce their services effectively (i.e., in line with the “agency 
ideology”), this type of agency has a high interest in influencing key policy 
decisions in its favor. Yesilkagit (2004) emphasizes that service-delivery 
agencies with a large number of middle-rank staff are especially keen on 
working conditions with little red tape and being detached from the ministe-
rial department where their work has a relatively low esteem. Thus, we 
draw the conclusion that service delivery agencies are more inclined toward 
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influencing policy decisions than agencies with other core tasks (e.g., agencies 
providing office-based public services).
Third, it may be “functional for the oversight authorities” to have the agency 
involved in the decision-making process or to exclude it from those decisions. 
Again, we assume that features of the policy program are highly important 
whether agency involvement in the decision-making process will be consid-
ered as being functional by the oversight authorities or not. In policy programs 
that are high priority for the oversight authorities and that are contested in the 
(political) environment, involvement of other actors (such as the agency) in 
the decision-making process may be considered “dysfunctional” for the over-
sight authorities (because they want to be sure that their preferred policy is not 
to be blurred too much by other actors during the decision-making process). 
This is also one of the reasons why VVM was not very much involved in the early 
stages of basic mobility: the minister wanted to take advantage of the momen-
tum, to forge a highly politically salient policy. Besides that, knowing that VVM 
initially was sceptical toward the policy, the minister had no interest in having 
the agency involved in designing the policy. In low-priority, low-political 
salience programs, the incentive of the oversight authorities to steer the agency 
may be much lower, potentially resulting in large levels of autonomy for the 
agency (Gains, 2003; Pollitt et al., 2004). Also, it may be functional for the 
minister to rely on the expertise of the agency to develop policies. This was 
the case with Pegasus, when the minister was dependent on the knowledge 
of the VVM, as expert in public transport delivery, to draft the plans for extend-
ing public transport.
Yet, whether an executive agency is able to deliver policy work also depends 
on the organization’s structural capacity. In basic terms, structural capacity 
refers to the available resources—more precisely, the number of qualified 
staff—for a given activity in an organization (Egeberg, 1999). A higher capac-
ity to perform policy work may enable an executive agency to have policy pro-
posals ready when a window of opportunity opens, and this is exactly what 
happened in the case of the measures to maintain the accessibility of met-
ropolitan areas in our case study. During the period of analysis, the agency’s 
capacity related to policy activities clearly increased. When the policy of 
basic mobility was formulated (around 2000), the capacities of the agency 
to perform policy work were only weakly developed. Following the advice 
of an independent audit report, an internal policy cell was created in 1998, 
which later was incorporated as research division into the main organizational 
structure of the (central) agency. Closely related, at the time when basic 
mobility was formulated, the agency saw its operation mission primarily as 
operating trams and buses, rather than doing policy work. Also, as a result of 
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a major restructuring at the beginning of the 1990s, the agency was focusing 
much more on internal organizational issues than policy design. Another 
aspect is the increase of highly skilled staff between 1999 and 2004 (relative 
to the number of blue-collar workers). Here, following a change of the political 
leadership in the ministry, the ministerial cabinet of advisors was replaced, 
and several of the highly skilled advisors who have been dealing with basic 
mobility (among other policies) started working for the agency. Thus, when 
the Pegasus policy was put into place (around 2002), the agency had the nec-
essary structural capacity to deliver policy work.
Also, the agency increasingly perceived itself as a policy unit in the field 
of public transport, thus moving beyond its initial role as bus and tram operator 
(Verschuere, 2006). In other words, doing policy work had become an appro-
priate behavior (March & Olsen, 2006) for the agency over time. The degree 
of appropriateness of doing policy work seems to vary across executive agen-
cies and countries (Elder & Page, 1998; Gains, 2003), and the way in which 
such norms of appropriateness develop and change merits further empirical 
enquiries (see Carpenter, 2001 for such an analysis in the U.S. context).
Another highly relevant factor for interactions between oversight authori-
ties and executive agencies is the degree of mutual trust. In the Flemish con-
text, the mutual trust between executive agencies and ministerial cabinets is 
fairly high, as opposed to a low-trust relationship between executive agencies 
and the oversight administration (Rommel & Christiaens, 2009). A high fre-
quency of personal interactions (often including the minister), former cabinet 
staff working in the agencies, and party-political congruence between cabinets 
and agency staff have been identified as key explanatory factors. With 
regard to our case study, we may conclude that the agency’s reputation as a 
trustworthy agent for policy implementation increased over time and eased its 
high level of influence on the Minder Hinder policy. On the one hand, the 
agency successfully implemented the basic mobility policy, which is in 
conflict with its prevailing agency ideology of demand-based service delivery. 
Hence, the agency signaled trustworthiness to the political oversight authority 
as a fairly neutral implementing agent. On the other hand, the agency dis-
played a rather low level of trust toward the minister when the basic mobility 
policy was formulated. The agency had suffered from financial cutbacks in 
the years before and hence was rather sceptical whether the political leader-
ship would stick to its promises regarding the financing of the basic mobility 
policy (which it did).
Finally, the research also sheds light on the perennial question of delegation 
and political control of the executive, which has been widely debated, espe-
cially in the U.S. context (Weingast, 2005; Yesilkagit & van Thiel, 2008). The 
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case study shows that the ministry’s political leadership (which is typical for 
Flanders) and the ministerial bureaucracy are the key principals of the exec-
utive agency (which is quite similar to other European countries; Döhler, 
2005; Pollitt et al., 2004; Yesilkagit & van Thiel, 2008). In the context of 
parliamentary government, the involvement of executive agencies in policy 
decisions by the oversight authorities may be considered as a mechanism of 
political control (Döhler, 2005). The inclusion of executive agencies and their 
policy preferences in policy decisions thus reduces the potential for bureau-
cratic drift in the implementation process. Also, the observed patterns of 
interaction are a mechanism by which the minister’s policy preferences are 
transferred to the executive agency, which in the daily business pays sig-
nificantly less attention to signals from the political leadership compared 
with ministerial bureaucracies (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). This suggests 
that including executive agencies in policy decisions increases political con-
trol of the bureaucracy, rather than the other way round.
Conclusion
This article wants to make a case for bringing politics into the study of execu-
tive agencies and delegated government. With the rise of delegated govern-
ment in many Western countries and the subsequent academic interest in this 
phenomenon, public agencies have been studied mostly from a managerial 
angle, whereas the impact of those changes on the relationship between policy 
and management has not been a major research topic. This might be surprising, 
given the important position of many executive agencies in the public domain 
and the fact that they are democratically accountable via elected politicians. 
The sparse literature and our case study show that executive agencies may 
play a considerable policy role in parliamentary systems of government, in 
interaction with elected officials and their support staff. The extent to which 
an executive agency is involved in policy making depends on several factors, 
such as the specific content of the policy program, the phase of the policy-
making process, the agency’s main task, the interests of both political actors 
and executive agencies, and the perceived threats and opportunities to further 
those interests.
However, there is a need to further explore the context in which executive 
agencies perform policy functions. In the theoretical discussion, we propose 
some factors that emerged from the case study and that may be helpful for 
explaining why agencies are involved in the policy-making process, taking 
into consideration that agencies are confronted with various policy pro-
grams at the same time and that policy influence may occur in the various 
stages of the policy cycle.
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From a normative point of view, the research shows that the functional sepa-
ration between policy making and implementation, often advocated by reform-
ers, is not always empirically valid and perhaps also not so desirable. Closer 
cooperation between government and implementing agencies in policy 
making may be advantageous for several reasons. First, involving policy 
implementers in the policy design can improve the quality of the policy 
because implementing actors, from their experience in the field, can pro-
vide policy decision makers with reality checks. Executive agencies possess 
substantive professional and experiential expertise, which is not always 
readily available in the ministerial bureaucracy (Beck Jørgensen et al., 1998; 
Elder & Page, 1998). In some cases, government may be highly dependent 
on the agencies’ expertise to develop realistic and effective policies, as the 
case study shows. In this context, further research should investigate the 
effect of task characteristics on executive agencies’ policy influence, which 
is a question beyond the scope of this article. Second, engaging policy imple-
menters in the policy may prevent potential adverse behavior of administrative 
actors in the implementation phase (Döhler, 2005). Thus, in situations when the 
ministerial bureaucracy tends to keep policy development at distance from 
executive agencies, problems of disconnection between both levels are likely 
to occur (HM Treasury & The Prime Minister’s Office of Public Services 
Reform, 2002). Third, cooperation in all stages of the policy cycle can 
increase trust levels between principals (government) and agents (implement-
ing agencies), and the executive agencies may also use trust-building strategies 
toward their principals (Rommel & Christiaens, 2009). This implies that 
the relationship between principal and agent not necessarily has to be regar-
ded in a negative sense (e.g., control for adverse behavior) but that principals 
and agents can build strong trust relationships through cooperation and 
communication.
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Note
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